Symmetrical Modernities? by Fleming, Chris & O'Carroll, John
Sometimes terms become commonplaces such
that they attain the status of conceptual lingua
franca; these terms and their associated mean-
ings come to pervade widely shared con-
ceptions of contemporary culture. Possible
examples are the words (and perhaps their
associations) modern and enchantment. A cus-
tomer browsing books who encountered the
titles Modern Enchantments and The Enchant-
ment of Modern Life could well be forgiven for
imagining them as having a subject matter in
common. The books under review here, how-
ever, would undermine such a presumption; if
there are symmetries and assumptions common
to both, they can best be distinguished by their
respective fields of inquiry. Simon During’s
book, ostensibly about secular magic, turns out
‘really’ to be an inquiry into the significance of
feigning, of the theatrical ruse and the ‘put-
on’—in ‘magic’ of course, but equally in film
and literature. (One thinks here of certain
parallels between During’s and Michael Taussig’s
influential book Mimesis and Alterity). Jane
Bennett’s book, on the other hand, seeks to out-
line (for want, no doubt, of better descriptors)
an ethico-epistemology and affective topology
of a re-figured modernity.
Given the above, it should come as no sur-
prise that the word enchantment works dif-
ferently in each study: During’s book uses it to
name the secular field he will explore radiating
out from the magic show; Bennett’s is a more
theoretical enterprise, where the word names
the possibilities of affective absorption afforded
by an engagement with a world that offers only
an immanent sense of the sacred. But perhaps
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it is easy—indeed, too easy—to overdraw the
disparities. In working through their respective
differences, though, we encounter assumptions
in common leading to surprising—and often
under-thought—symmetries between the two
works. In particular, there are shared—and
perhaps troubling—axioms, common straw-
doll enemies (‘baddies’ perhaps), parallel aims.
Having said this, let us begin (again) with a
word or two on each of the projects. During’s
book spends three chapters unfolding the
inquiry: one sketching the history of magic
from antiquity, one theorising enchantment and
modernity, and one exploring the prehistory 
of modern secular magic’s ambivalent role in
the late Renaissance and Enlightenment. There
follows a series of what look like excursions.
Chapter 4 journeys into the nineteenth-century
field of magic shows themselves, but Chapter 5
(film) and Chapter 6 (literature) take us into
what, on the face of it, seem less ‘core’ aspects
of ‘secular magic’—areas to which the descrip-
tor is applied with a dexterity at the service 
of considerable metaphorical displacement—
before returning to magic stages and places in
Chapter 7. The eighth, and final, chapter looks
at the optical apparatuses of magic—the magic
lantern, the photograph and film. In Modern
Enchantments, in other words, we sense a
deeper, or perhaps residual, inquiry into staging
and fictionality on the one hand and an in-
stability in the field of ‘secular magic’ that this
label of During’s itself implies on the other.
During’s book is admirable insofar as it thought-
fully engages the possibilities of using the
notion of secular magic as a theoretical lens to
example select cultural phenomena of modern-
ity. Despite its title, this book is comparatively
modest in its theoretical ambition, a project
that During largely carries off with scholarly
detail and few pyrotechnics.
Bennett’s Enchantment of Modernity seeks to
offer a new politics of affective engagement
with the world. This she derives largely from a
revivified Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,
two writers renowned in the 1970s for their
work on madness and capitalism—and who, in
Australia at least, are currently undergoing a
renaissance of sorts. This leads to, among other
things, an exploration of ethics and the body.
Aware of the lure of Romanticism, Bennett
rehearses these and related issues in her chap-
ter ‘Ethical Energetics’, which also looks at
Friedrich von Schiller and the later Michel
Foucault. Most suggestively of all, she takes 
up the work of Richard Flatman on language
and ethics, showing that there’s always a gap
between ‘ethical rules and ethical outcomes’.
(152) Again, though, she gives up this line of
inquiry by turning back to Deleuze and
Guattari, because Flatman ‘underplays [lan-
guage’s] somatic character’. (153) Intriguingly,
the book takes the work of Stephen White on
weak ontology to argue a new way of relating to
and being in the world. This idea is not particu-
larly well developed; it appears more as an end-
point or suggestion than a formula. Yet given
the text’s obvious hostility to Christianity, the
resonance of this idea with Gianni Vattimo’s
profoundly Christian version of the same, the
Italian philosopher’s reflections on ‘pensiero
debole’ [weak thought]—or indeed Charles
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Taylor’s centrality to the debate—does appear
to raise more questions than it answers in 
terms of the ontological character of the
unambiguously post-Christian world she
posits. Rather than this query being seen as
expressive of conflicting priorities or agendas
between the reviewers’ views and the author’s,
we see it as a necessary engagement only
because of the purported terrain of the reflec-
tion—modernity and enchantment. Indeed,
this is especially true since the enchant-
ment–modernity nexus itself should really be
seen as a hypothesis rather than an established
historical fact. There are complicated issues
here that are elided by the author in too sum-
mary a fashion.
In this regard, both books share in a version
of history that might best be called the ‘dis-
enchantment hypothesis of modernity’. This
has a narrative rather than analytic structure
insofar as it is usually retold or assumed rather
than argued anew in each case. After Max
Weber, and perhaps Blumenberg, it holds that
prior to a posited onset of reason, superstition
held sway—fides held sway over ratio, dogma
presided over debate. The Enlightenment
(usually) is seen as dispelling superstition and
replacing it with reason. The consequence of
this is a disenchantment of the world, often
seen as a twofold process with Christianity first
dispelling the immanent pantheistic spirits, and
then Christianity itself being dispelled. Bennett
accepts the nihilist universe of the disenchant-
ment hypothesis (again, here she draws close to
Vattimo), but does not accept that it is without
affect or valid reasons for wonder and a sense of
the numinous. While During does not explore
the issue on its own terms, he too clearly
accepts this version of history; but this is not a
flaw in his work given that his is not the task of
theorising a renewed modernity.
It is not as if During has not theorising
impulses of his own. Yet he seems to choke off
such inquiry just whenever it is getting going.
We say this not as a lament for a book we wish
During might have written but because at every
turn he seems to be resisting the impulse to
write it. The final fascinating chapter nominally
dedicated to the optical machineries of magic,
for instance, is driven by no such thing. It is, as
he puts it very well himself, an exploration 
of ‘Spinozism in relation to the emergence’ 
of these apparatuses. (261) As it stands, the
discussion of Spinozism—from the name of
Baruch Spinoza—casts a strange and nuanced
light on that philosopher currently made
popular through the works of Deleuze and
Guattari. During remarks that Spinozism is a
‘spiritually tinged secularism which swept
throughout Europe from about 1770’. (261)
(Again, this is a very popular version of Spinoza
at present, one that can be upheld perhaps only
by a particularly narrow reading of the Ethics,
combined with a refusal to countenance or take
seriously works such as his Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus.) Using ETA Hoffmann’s novella The
Master Flea to open the account and George
Eliot’s Daniel Deronda to explore it, During
notes the influence of the ‘immanent rather
than transcendental understanding of the uni-
verse’ that inflects the stories and Spinozism,
and how indeed film itself is also related ‘to that
ambitious and sensitive form of philosophical
secularism first described by Spinoza which
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was most influential in absorbing and dis-
playing older forms of spiritualism’. (260, 261)
But technologies such as the magic lantern
seemed to endanger Spinozism, because these
‘technologize’ the imagination and construct a
‘material membrane on images’. (265) Thus,
Spinoza ‘belonged to that rationalist and scien-
tifically curious community in which the
instrument was devised but despised it’. (266)
In a way curiously related to Bennett’s weak
ontology, During shows how Spinozism existed
in weak and strong versions (with the latter
seeking to scientifically validate supernatural
experience and to ‘retain a realm of imaginative
culture’). (266–7) But the Spinozist view (either
way) was to lose: ‘almost everywhere in our
culture (except perhaps in the academic
humanities) George Albert Smith and the heirs
of the magic assemblage have triumphed over
the endeavours of Gurney, Deronda, and
Spinoza’. (278)
Citing Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett
endorses a version of immanence widely
assumed to be Spinozist both early in her work
and more explicitly near the end, when she
favours a version of the cosmos that ‘names a
dimension of being with all conceptual and
experiential strata … that energetic aspect of
things, thoughts, matter, which has not (yet)
crystallized into a place of knowing or belong-
ing’. (166) But unlike Spinoza whose secularity
implied an immanent spirituality, there is no
spiritual plane that we can discern in Bennett’s
account because she discounts this possibility.
For her, ‘an intrinsically meaningless world also
brings new opportunities for freedom’. (60) In
this respect, those who share this view might
profit further from an exploration of the kind
Adam Seligman undertook into the possibility
of a sceptically founded epistemology in his
Modernity’s Wager (2000), which finds a basis
for modernity in a renewal of inquiries of the
seventeenth century.
If the two writers share in the disenchant-
ment hypothesis, their works occupy a fairly
circumscribed, even narrow, theoretical terrain.
Both repeat a recognisable kind of cultural
studies orthodoxy that involves straw dolls of
whom the best known is Theodor Adorno.
Adorno is seen by During as ‘restrictive and
misplaced’, ‘losing’ sight of the spread of
pleasures, competencies, and experiences that
secular magic afforded; he is also seen as failing
to see that individuals can be both enchanted
and disenchanted at the same time (65–6). And
contrary to the jacket notes of Bennett’s book to
the effect that hers is a book written generously,
let alone straw dolls, her work systematically
constructs an oppositionally founded inquiry,
responding not only to what she calls the
‘failure’ of Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, (123)
or aspects of Weber’s disenchantment thesis
itself, but also, in surprisingly vindictive lan-
guage to anyone who cannot ‘profit’ with a
‘heroic will’ of the Nietzschean-Deleuzian
variety, ‘to choose rather than the cowardly slide
into resentment’. (60) Where During’s terms of
analysis are elusive at worst, suggestive at best,
Bennett’s are programmatic and dogmatic at
worst, illuminating at best. In this respect, it is
worth elaborating Bennett’s work a little further
so its distinctive qualities may be made clearer.
The reliance on Deleuze and Guattari is, of
course, familiar in cultural studies analysis of
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late. But it makes for some odd effects. Their
gauche and once gauchist critiques of capital-
ism might once have seen like prescriptions for
a better future. Unlike most theorists who are
good at remedies but bad at fortune telling,
Deleuze and Guattari’s work was strangely pro-
phetic, as their dream of flows and Nietzschean
yea-saying and even of assemblages came true:
nomads to do indeed walk the earth (and God
help them find a permanent job—or country).
And other princes of the universe (Richard
Branson et al) are the figureheads of the push to
annihilate centralised governance of any kind.
What flows, of course, is money (the other
things flow too, of course). Their revolutionary
prescriptions happened without bloodshed in
many places, and are even more cruel than what
they replaced. In Bennett, there is a certain
uneasiness at crucial moments of the Deleuze
and Guattari manifold: she is quick to move
beyond the account of the horse masochist
(927), and when it comes to Deleuze’s account
of Franz Kafka, Bennett responds in an
extremely interesting way. She cites their Kafka
repeatedly—in her account of interspeciesism,
in enchantment, even the idea of the somatic
sonority of language. (20, 51, 153) But it is in
her discussion of laughter itself that we gain the
most telling citation of all. Here we learn, via
Deleuze and Guattari, that when Kafka first
read the opening of The Trial to friends, ‘he
laughed so much that at times he could not
read any further’. (108) Citing approvingly
their contention that Kafka’s was a ‘joyous’
laughter, creating worlds for us to wonder at
and enjoy, Bennett assures us that all this is ‘fic-
tion’ and that ‘no harm accrues to real people’,
that we can feel free to ‘draw analogies’. (110)
Yet we must ourselves wonder about this—
about a humour (Kafka’s, supposedly) Deleuze
and Guattari’s, Bennett’s that makes of fictional
Joseph K’s (the Trial) or K’s (The Castle) bureau-
cratic anxieties and nightmares a circus for our
mere enjoyment. We recall too the contexts of
the joke, and not just the bureaucratic blunder
Bennett is comfortable to relate, but also the
trajectory of Joseph K who, for reasons we
never quite get to find out, ends his days when
his throat is ‘cut like a dog’. Bennett assures us,
with the cheery tone of the Nietzschean yea-
sayer, that it better to drop the sceptical mode
(advocated as we noted before by Seligman)
and instead to think anew:
Another strategy is to strengthen the will to
resist the enchantment of violence by feed-
ing that will with food of another kind of
enchantment, the enchantment of the
wondrous complexity of life. The idea here
is to fight enchantment with enchantment,
to weaken the appeal of violence by infus-
ing oneself with the affective energy of a
more life-giving mood. (110)
Thus the advertising spruiker prevails over the
cynic. Like Deleuze’s version of Kafka.
Readers will, we suspect, discern that we are
not entirely comfortable with the ethos that
Bennett takes for granted in this book. We sus-
pect, indeed, that Adorno and Horkheimer
might supply a better antidote to violence of
this kind than distraction, and if an antidote 
is needed to them, that might be a lesser
problem.
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Bennett’s book operates on a narrow theor-
etical terrain, but does attempt something
theoretically coherent that is well worth read-
ing. If we are inclined to question the limits she
puts on her inquiry to start with, the book is to
be welcomed as an attempt to make sense of
this as a field. During’s book, strangely, shows
signs of being perhaps more theoretically
astute, but his is a project that is deceptively
titled—it offers a glimpse of an under-thought
field of interconnection, one that lies between
fiction, film and optics, magic and, ever so dis-
creetly, God itself.
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